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Abstract: The September 2008 collapse of the Lehman Brothers group marked the nadir of 
the global financial crisis. While the regulatory aftermath has been extensively debated, the 
effects of the case law that arose from the insolvency have not. This paper explains the need to 
redress the balance. It starts by considering the quantity and qualities of the Lehmans case law, 
examining why the 30 plus decisions handed down by the English courts enjoy an unusually 
high precedent-setting potential. The paper proceeds by analysing the precedential effects of 
these decisions, and it reports on a recent workshop held at the London School of Economics 
that met to consider this question. Subject to the event’s terms of engagement, the paper draws 
out several themes from the discussion, including the impact of the Lehmans cases on the 
principles of contractual interpretation, the law of trusts and insolvency law. By way of 
conclusion, it is submitted that the impact of Lehmans case law reaches far beyond that 
particular insolvency, to worldwide users of standard form documents, the global financial 
markets and the common law itself. Seen in this light, the Lehmans case law is a significant, but 
under-appreciated, side-effect of the global financial crisis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At 6.56am London time on 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
(‘LBHI’) became the biggest bankruptcy in US history.1 LBHI was the ultimate 
parent company of the Lehman Brothers group, with some 2,000 subsidiaries 
worldwide.2 Around 80 of these subsidiaries entered into insolvency proceedings 
in 18 different jurisdictions shortly after LBHI.3 Related litigation started in the 
English courts almost immediately, with the earliest reported decisions including 
Mr Justice Morgan’s refusal of RAB Capital’s urgent application seeking the return 
of its assets from its Lehman prime broker.4 Since then, the litigation arising out of 
the Lehman Brothers’ insolvency has continued apace. As regards the English 
courts, there have been at least 33 decisions to date, eight of which have been 
handed down by the Court of Appeal, and three by the Supreme Court.5  
This paper considers the importance and impact of this set of cases, and it is 
organised in two main parts. The first draws upon the full set of Lehmans 
decisions handed down by the English courts since September 2008, in order to 
assess its precedent-setting potential. The discussion looks into the group’s 
organisation and the nature of the contracts underpinning disputed transactions as 
a way of explaining the quantity and qualities of these decisions. This part of the 
paper concludes that the Lehmans cases have an unusually high capacity to change 
the legal rules affecting a broad sweep of stakeholders. The following part of the 
paper starts to evaluate some of these precedential effects. The discussion 
proceeds by drawing out some of the findings of a recent conference, ‘Law after 
Lehmans’, which was held at the London School of Economics in October 2013. 
The analysis is organised around contract, trusts and insolvency law. It considers 
examples where Lehmans cases have had an impact by way of precedent, and also 
where these decisions which have triggered new legislation. The paper concludes 
that the Lehmans insolvency has already had a marked effect by way of the courts, 
and this side-effect of the global financial crisis deserves much closer scrutiny 
from regulators and academics alike.  
 
                                                     
1 In evidence given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, LBHI’s lawyer, Harvey Miller of Weil, 
Gotshall & Manches LLP, described this as the ‘largest, most complex, multi-faceted and far-reaching 
bankruptcy case ever filed in the United States’. Evidence quoted in Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final 
Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United 
States (PublicAffairs: 2011) 340. (Hereafter, the ‘FCIR’). 
2 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch) (hereafter, ‘CASS7 first instance’) [44] 
and [49], reproducing the parties’ Statement of Assumed Facts.  
3 FCIR, n 1 above, 340. LBIE entered into administration on 7.56am on the same day. See discussion in 
text accompanying n 20 below.  
4 RAB Capital  v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2008] EWHC 2335 (Ch). 
5 The term ‘decisions’ rather than ‘cases’ is used in order to capture multiple decisions in the same case, 
i.e., ‘decisions’ includes rulings on applications (e.g., for summary judgment) as well as judgments after 
trial and appeals. The details of these decisions are set out in various forms in the two Appendices to this 
article.  
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PRECEDENT-SETTING POTENTIAL 
 
Why does the Lehmans litigation matter? In terms of history, the cases that 
continue to flow out of the collapse of the fourth largest investment bank in the 
US6 deserve attention as part of a full account of what the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve (and distinguished economic historian) Ben Bernanke called this 
‘calamity’.7 As 2008’s many analogies with the Great Depression showed, policy-
makers can draw valuable lessons from rigorous historical accounts. However, in 
terms of law, the cases are important for a more pressing reason, namely, their 
capacity to apply, and thereby develop, legal rules. Thus, when the courts 
adjudicate questions arising from events like the collapse of Lehmans, they create a 
feedback loop between law and the crisis.  
While every case may enjoy the potential to set precedent, this part of the 
paper explains why the Lehmans cases are particularly likely to do so. Most 
obviously, this is because of the high volume of Lehman-related decisions handed 
down by the English courts over the last five years. The effects of this spike of 
cases are particularly significant in an area of law where relatively few cases reach 
appellate level and, at the same time, the rules remain overwhelmingly ‘judge-
made’.8 In addition, however, these decisions are unusually comprehensive, 
concerned with highly standardised subject-matter, typically focused on the law 
rather than facts, and, in some instances, the result of relatively rare procedural 
steps that are designed to produce judgments of broad applicability. Therefore, it 
is not only the quantity, but also the qualities of the Lehman cases, that explain 
their extensive impact on the law. These qualities may be explained by two 
underlying factors in play in the Lehman Brothers group’s insolvency, which are 
considered further below.  
 
THE GROUP’S ORGANISATION  
 
The first factor that helps to explain the precedent-setting capacity of the English 
courts’ decisions arising from the collapse of Lehmans is the organisation of the 
group’s businesses. As described in some detail in several of the reported cases, 
including particularly the pensions litigation, the Lehman Brothers group was 
organised by reference to products rather than by company or by jurisdiction. 9 As 
it was put in one decision 
                                                     
6 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2011] UKSC 38, [18]. 
7 Evidence of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke to the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
reproduced at FCIR n 1 above, 339. Ben Bernanke was an academic specialising in the Great Depression 
before his government career. He expressly drew on this historical perspective in the midst of managing 
the recent crisis. See, for e.g., B Bernanke, Essays on the Great Depression (Princeton University Press: 2004). 
8 R Goode, Commercial Law in the next Millennium (Sweet & Maxwell: 1998) 15.  
9 The group’s organisation was particularly significant, and therefore scrutinised at length, in the Lehmans 
pensions litigation, part of which considered whether a ‘Financial Support Direction’ should be imposed 
on Lehman entities including LBHI, LBEL and LBIE for the benefit of the pension scheme run on 
behalf of 4,400 employees by their employer, a Lehmans operating company LBL. For e.g., see Lehman 
Brothers Pension Scheme [2010] Pens LR 445 [22]-[36].  
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[...] the group operated on global business/ product lines, which cut across 
the legal entity structure, with the top management in New York, supported 
by regional headquarters in London and Tokyo.10 
 
Later on, the same judgment, citing the administrators’ evidence, described how 
the group was ‘organised in functional and market areas, rather than by legal 
entity’ and on a day to day basis it was ‘managed and run mainly along global 
product lines, rather than as separate entities’.11 This turned out to be very 
significant for London. The group’s European hub, Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) Ltd (‘LBIE’), was based here, and, thanks to this feature of 
the group’s organisation, it became involved in a vast array of different businesses. 
LBIE’s ‘street facing’ businesses included prime brokerage,12 investment banking 
and investment management.13 As we know from the cases discussed in detail later 
in this paper, it also traded extensively in OTC derivatives. In addition, it had very 
significant dealing with client property, which was ultimately held by a web of 
depositories, exchanges, affiliates, clearing systems and sub-custodians.14 LBIE 
also played a pivotal role in proprietary trading and diverse intra-group 
transactions.15 Moreover, ‘it was a main repository for the property of its affiliates 
in connection with their activities in Europe’.16 As an indication of the sheer 
complexity of its dealings, at the time of the collapse, LBIE had a reported 700 
bank accounts,17 140,000 failed or pending trades18 and 1,707 account holders 
                                                     
10 ibid,[11].  
11 ibid, [34(ii)]. Emphasis added by the Court. 
12 See the discussion of LBIE’s businesses in paragraph 2.5 of the parties’ statement of agreed facts 
reproduced in LBIE, n 2 above, [49]. This describes how LBIE provided prime brokerage services across 
Europe, US and Asia, providing clients with trade execution, clearing and settlement, custodial and 
reporting services, OTC derivatives, and secured lending of cash and stock. 
13 ibid, describing the six divisions of LBIE: prime services, investment banking, equities, fixed income, 
investment management and principal investing. 
14 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2009] EWHC 2141 (Ch), [7].  
15 For e.g., the intra-group transactions that were considered in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) 
[2011] EWCA Civ 1544 (the ‘Rascals’ litigation). LBIE also put together deals involving other Lehmans 
entities. For example in Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2011] EWHC 1822 
(Ch) LBIE ‘devised and marketed’ two investment products, both based on ‘large and complex 
structures’ [2], including derivatives entered into by Lehman Brothers Finance SA, and guaranteed by 
LBHI, at [1]. In the same vein, the Extended Liens litigation (see n 16, below) arose because LBIE held 
securities for Lehmans affiliates. As discussed in July 2011 decision on an interim application in relation 
to this matter, the ‘immensely complicated affairs of the Lehman group’ meant that the affiliates were 
uncertain which side of the argument to advance in the context of this application (Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) [2011] EWHC 2022 (Ch) [5] and [8].  
16 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), [7] (hereafter, the ‘Extended Liens’ 
decision). Transactions between Lehmans affiliates were often linked to LBIE’s client business. For e.g., 
LBIE entered into derivatives with LBF to off-set LBIE’s client positions and shift the risk to LBF, as 
seen in Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2013] EWCA Civ 118 (hereafter, 
the ‘Back to Back Transactions’ decision).  
17 CASS7 First Instance, n 2 above, [49] at paragraph 2.20 of statement of assumed facts.  
18 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2008] EWHC 2869 (Ch), [22].  
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were thought to have potential claims against LBIE for the return of trust 
property.19 
LBIE entered administration at 7.56am London time on 15 September 2008 
(i.e., shortly after LBHI).20 In the ordinary course of events, dealings between 
LBIE and affiliates and clients took place, it seemed, without a great deal of 
attention often being paid to the precise ownership or location of property.21 This 
all changed with the onset of insolvency. Now, LBIE’s counterparties rushed to 
establish their proprietary rights in order to extract their assets from the 
administration and thereby avoid the fate facing unsecured creditors. As the Court 
of Appeal pointed out in the ‘Rascals’ decision, complex arrangements whose legal 
effects had mattered little when the group was solvent were now subject to 
interpretation on a ‘strict’ basis.22 This urgent hunt for proprietary rights was made 
even more complex because, as became apparent over the course of the litigation, 
LBIE’s day-to-day operations were not always performed as they should have 
been. Mr Justice Briggs observed that the background to one application was the 
‘imperfect and hugely complex real world occupied by LBIE and it numerous 
creditors’.23 The most notable example to have featured in the case law to date was 
LBIE’s failure to segregate its clients’ assets, which was described as 
‘spectacular’.24  
For all of these reasons, the LBIE administration has proved remarkable for 
its ‘enormous size and complexity’.25 Unsurprisingly in these circumstances, it has 
generated a stream of cases in the Chancery Division of the High Court. The 
majority have originated by way of the administrators of LBIE’s statutory right to 
apply to the court for ‘directions in connection with his functions’.26 Indeed, the 
                                                     
19 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [ 2009] EWCA Civ 1161, [8]. 
20 CASS7 first instance, n 2 above, [49] at paragraph 2.7 of statement of assumed facts. The relative 
timing of the collapse of LBHI and LBIE is discussed in Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc [2010] EWHC 3372 
(Ch), [30].  
21 For example, the automated Rascals system continued to operate for some time after the insolvency of 
LBIE, until it was turned off on 23 September 2008. Rascals, n 15 above, [14]. 
22 Rascals, n 15 above, [17]. This process, which was so heavily scrutinised in the course of the litigation, 
was entirely an internal book-keeping exercise: as regards outsiders, LBIE remained the owner of the 
securities throughout, ibid [16].  
23 CASS7 first instance, n 2 above, [7]. 
24 For example, for the purposes of this application, Mr Justice Briggs was invited to assume that LBIE 
failed 'on a truly spectacular scale' to segregate the client money of its own affiliates. As a result, there was 
a shortfall between client money claims and actual segregated client money of around a billion dollars, ibid 
[4].  
25 ibid, [46]. Details of the administration of LBIE have been very helpfully documented in ten (so far) 
progress reports published by the administrators of LBIE, available at  
http://www.pwc.co.uk/business-recovery/administrations/lehman/lehmans-joint-administrators-
progress-report-140409.jhtml (last accessed 20 December 2013). 
26 Pursuant to paragraph 63 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Note that the administrators’ 
position as regards the questions they bring to court varies. In some applications, the administrators were 
neutral; for example in CASS7 case, they were described by the judge as having ‘proffered submissions, in 
effect, as amici’ on most of the issues. CASS7, n 2 above, [22]. In other applications, they were ‘by no 
means neutral’; for example one application took ‘the form of a straightforward adversarial contest 
between LBIE, acting by the Administrators, and LBF, acting by its own insolvency office holders.’ 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2012] EWHC 1072 (Ch), [3] 
(successfully appealed in the Back to Back Transactions appeal, n 16 above). The administrators resisted 
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use of this statutory right goes a long way towards explain the volume of English 
decisions arising out of the Lehmans insolvency over the last five years. Of the 
eight Lehmans matters that have proceeded to the Court of Appeal or further 
since 2008, all but two were originally initiated by applications on behalf of the 
administrators.27    
The administrators’ applications not only affect the quantity but also the 
qualities of judgments, specifically by making them more comprehensive in 
significant ways. First, various representative parties were often joined to 
proceedings in order to set up an adversarial hearing on an issue and represent 
different stakeholders’ interests.28 In some cases, third parties were also 
represented in order to assist the court, including ISDA as Intervenor in the 
Lomas cases, the FSA in the CASS7 cases, and the London Investment Banking 
Association in the Scheme of Arrangement cases. Secondly, more parties and 
more lawyers mean more written submissions and more authorities (for instance, 
no fewer than 11 files of authorities were provided to the court in the Extended 
Liens case). Thirdly, the value29 and complexity of the issues, as well as the 
number of parties, helped to sustain long, and apparently productive, hearings.30 
While hearings of considerable duration are far from unusual in commercial cases, 
a common driver is the high number of witnesses of fact, for example as seen in 
misrepresentation claims such as Standard Chartered Bank.31 However, in several of 
the LBIE applications, statements of fact were agreed by the parties, and the long 
hearings were devoted entirely to submissions on questions of law.32  
                                                                                                                                       
early applications for information and/or assets by LBIE clients in RAB Capital, n 4 above and LIBE, n 
18 above. At first instance in the Rascals litigation, the judge described the hearing as a ‘straight 
adversarial fight between LBIE and 5 of its affiliates’ Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2010] 
EWHC 2914, [25].  
27 The two appeals not originally initiated by applications by the administrators are Belmont, n 6 above and 
Trustees of Lehman Brothers Pension Scheme v Pensions Regulator [2013] EWCA Civ 751.  
28 Note that in order for the court to be able to determine such issues, these applications require ‘parties 
ready either in their own interests or on a representative basis to argue each relevant corner.’ Extended 
Liens disclosure application, Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2011] EWHC 2022 (Ch), [14]. In this 
case, ‘[t]he court’s requirement, in order to deal effectively with the issues raised, is that there should be 
identified parties prepared to argue, in summary, for and against Extended Liens’. Ibid. ‘Representative’ 
litigants were also replied upon in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch) 
(hereafter, ‘MCF’) and in the CASS7 litigation. The latter included representatives from a ‘spectrum of 
competing interests’ CASS7 first instance, n 2 above, [23].  
29 See, for e.g., n 24 above.   
30 For e.g., there were six days of legal argument as well as 11 files of authorities in the Extended Liens 
case, n 16 above. At ibid, [6] the judge praises the process for drawing out the legal issues. The first 
instance hearing in Rascals took the best part of three weeks (Referenced in the CA decision, Rascals, n 
15 above [2]). 
31 Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2011] EWHC 1785 (Comm). In this case, the 
claimant called eight witnesses of fact and submitted a written statement from a ninth, while the 
defendant called 10. In addition, each side called a Sri Lankan law expert. [55]-[56], [66] and [392].  
32 I.e., where the court is invited to base its decision on statements of fact agreed by the parties for the 
purpose of the hearing only. See, for e.g., Extended Liens, n16 above, [4]. The trial of two closely related 
Part 8 claims in Anthracite, n 15 above, also proceeded on the basis of agreed facts. In the CASS7 
litigation, the legal issues were also determined on the basis of assumed facts. The CASS7 decision 
confirmed that this was ‘relatively unusual’. CASS7 first instance, n 2 above, [48]. Helpfully, the statement 
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The substantive effects of this narrowly-focused and highly intensive type of 
hearing are evident across the Lehman decisions. The Extended Liens decision is a 
good example.33 Here, a fundamentally important question about the treatment of 
floating charges under the Financial Collateral Arrangements (no 2) Regulations 
2003 (‘FCAR’) presented itself in the course of an application about the effects of 
an intra-group security document. This question had been troubling academics 
and practitioners for some time, because it was never quite clear how floating 
charges fitted into the UK collateral regime established in order to implement the 
Financial Collateral Directive (‘FCD’).34 There had been one English decision on 
the applicability of the FCAR to floating charges before the Extended Liens case, 
but it was not regarded as definitive, bearing in mind the importance of this point 
of law. Indeed, Briggs J expressly contrasts the Extended Liens case with this 
decision, Gray v GTP Group,35 which was a ‘short hearing about a low-value 
matter’.36 In the Lehmans case, submissions explored in great detail matters 
including the travaux préparatoires of the FCD and the academic commentary,37 with 
the overall effect that the judge considered himself in a position to sidestep Gray 
and rule on these questions afresh in Extended Liens.38 Similarly, in the substantial 
‘Back to Back Transactions’ decision, the Court of Appeal noted that there had 
hitherto only been one authority on the 2002 (as opposed to 1992) MA. Like 
Gray, this earlier matter was a relatively small dispute, which was in fact resolved 
at the summary judgment stage (BNP v Wockhardt).39 In short, there was no 
authority prior to this Lehmans case on the fundamentally important early 
termination provisions of the 2002 version of the ISDA MA.40 Seen in this way, 
the LBIE administrators’ applications created rare opportunities for the courts to 
rule on several fundamentally important questions of financial law, and, what is 
more, the nature of the applications enabled them to do so with the benefit of 
lengthy and expert submissions.  
                                                                                                                                       
and supplements are reproduced almost in full in this judgment, at [49]. Not all the Lehmans decisions 
proceeded on this basis, however. For e.g., in Rascals, some facts were agreed, some were disputed. 
Rascals first instance, n 26 above, [38].  
33 Extended Liens application, n 16 above.  
34 2002/47/EC. This matter is discussed, for e.g., in J Benjamin, Financial Law (OUP: 2007) [20.112]-
[20.117], noting that ‘London industry voices' had called upon the European Commission to clarify the 
status of floating charges under the Financial Collateral Directive.  
35 [2010] EWHC 1772 (Ch). In this case, Vos J held that the terms in question did not confer legal control 
to the collateral taker. Legal, rather than merely administrative, control was need for the charge to qualify 
under FCAR.  
36 Extended Liens, n 16 above, [135].  At ibid, [118] Briggs J confirms that the judge in Gray did not have 
‘anything approaching the depth and detail of the legal argument deployed in this present case’.  
37 ibid [74]-[148]. 
38 ibid [127]. Although Briggs J ultimately held that the security rights conferred by the LBIE-LBF Master 
Custody Agreement fell short of qualifying under FCAR, his reasoning opens up the possibility for a 
floating charge qualifying in ways Vos J’s decision did not. For instance, Briggs J held that the charge for 
LBIE’s own debts would have qualified had it stood alone, see ibid [144].  
39 Back to Back Transactions, Court of Appeal, n 16 above, [56], mentioning BNP v Wockhardt [2009] 
EWHC 3116, but confirming it ‘is not relevant’ to the questions in hand.  
40 Back to Back Transactions, at first instance, n 26 above, [39]. 
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The objectives of the administrators’ applications also make the decisions 
more thorough than those arising in a more typical adversarial context.41 Because 
the administrators’ intention was to apply the decisions in various contexts in the 
administration (i.e., the decisions were to serve as a form of precedent within the 
administrative process),42 they requested that judgments deal with moot points, 
alternatives43 and even points which the parties had already settled.44 It is striking 
that the courts seemed to comply with virtually all of these requests, making for 
unusually comprehensive decisions. What appears to be a higher than usual 
prospect of appeal also seemed to have had this effect at first instance. Of course, 
this is not to say that these decisions all went the way the administrators were 
hoping; the Court of Appeal’s rejection of the administrators’ Scheme of 
Arrangement case shows as much. Rather, it is clear, first, that the administrators’ 
statutory applications account for the bulk of the English Lehmans-related case 
law, and secondly, that the fact that all this time and effort was spent to ‘seek the 
courts’ guidance’45 had a clear and substantive effect on the decisions which were 
handed down as a result.   
 
STANDARDISED CONTRACTS  
 
The second factor explaining the unusual precedential effects of the Lehman 
decisions is the nature of the contracts in dispute. These contracts can collectively 
be described as ‘standardised financial contracts’, where this term includes both 
trade association drafted agreements, such as the ISDA Master Agreement, 
International Prime Brokerage Agreement, or ‘industry standard’ repo 
documentation46 and the standardised contracts used within the Lehmans group, 
such as the Master Custody Agreement considered in the Extended Liens 
decision.47 
Many standardised financial contracts offer English law and the English 
courts as default choices, or one of the default choices.48 For example, this is the 
                                                     
41 E.g., as seen in Gray or BNP, discussed in n 35 and n 39 above.    
42E.g., in the Back to Back Transactions application, the administrators were seeking a ruling they could 
apply to many contracts rather than a ruling on any one scenario in particular. It was noted by the Court 
of Appeal that the  administrators ‘are concerned that there are or may be security rights against other 
entities  than LBF governed purely by agreements in the same form as the STB’. Back to Back 
Transactions, Court of Appeal, n 16 above, [216]. 
43 E.g., Extended Liens application, n 16 above, [51]-[53] comments on the position were an earlier part 
of the decision held to be incorrect on appeal.  
44 ibid, [241], where the judge decides a point which settled between the end of the hearing and judgment. 
The reason given was that the parties wanted a judgment which addressed issues ‘including those not 
strictly necessary to my decision’.  
45 MCF, n 28 above, [1]. 
46 Discussed in Rascals and described as ‘industry standard terms’ at [15] of the first instance judgment, n 
26 above, and in the Court of Appeal decision, n 15 above, [11]. 
47 The latter category is routinely described as ‘standard contracts’ in the Lehmans case law, e.g. the MCA 
and STB in issue in the Extended Liens application are described a ‘two standard form documents’ 
Extended Liens, n 16 above, [1].  
48 As noted in a recent ISDA publication:  
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case in the 1992 and 2002 ISDA Master Agreement. Across complex transactions, 
this ensures consistency; for instance, all of the relevant parts of the ‘complex web 
of contractual documentation’ in the Belmont transaction were governed by 
English law.49 As a result of such drafting, foreign businesses are routinely pulled 
into this jurisdiction when contractual disputes arise.50 This helps to explain the 
origins of several of the English Lehman decisions that were not generated by the 
LBIE administrators’ applications.51  
Having drawn the disputes into the English courts, standardised contractual 
subject-matter then adds a further dimension to a decision’s precedent-setting 
potential. Because standard terms are litigated relatively rarely and the knock-on 
effects are so far-reaching, even first instance decisions interpreting such 
documentation (such as the Extended Liens application) attract very keen 
attention. In response, judgments often openly express a sense of responsibility to 
parties beyond the courtroom doors. This is apparent, for example, in decisions 
interpreting terms like the Close-out Amount provisions of the 2002 ISDA MA52 
or considering the ‘purpose’ element of the ‘security financial collateral 
arrangement’ definition in the FCARs.53 This weight of expectation, whether 
originating from LBIE administrators intending to use judicial decisions as tools in 
their work, or from the users of standard terms more broadly, results in judgments 
that are both more comprehensive in terms of the law, and more sensitive to the 
dynamics of the global financial markets. 
  
                                                                                                                                       
‘Historically, international financial transactions have tended to be documented under agreements 
governed by English or New York law and which contain jurisdiction clauses conferring jurisdiction on 
the English or New York courts. These are, of, course, the options provided for in the 1992 and 2002 
ISDA Master Agreements.’  
ISDA, Memorandum for Members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., The use 
of arbitration under an ISDA Master Agreement, (ISDA, 10 November 2011) 4.2.  
49 Belmont, n 16 above, [10]. See also Lehman Brothers Commodity Services v Credit Agricole Corporate and 
Investment Bank (formerly Calyon) [2011] EWHC 1390 (Comm), where the Letter of Credit and ISDA MA 
between the claimant and EDF were both subject to English law. In Rascals, the web of contracts 
involved were governed by English, NY and Swiss law but the court was invited to assume for all, bar the 
NY contract, that interpretation under foreign law would arrive at the same outcome as if they were 
governed by English law. Rascals, first instance, n 26 above [112].  
50 Though sometimes parties contest jurisdiction in these circumstances. See, for e.g., LB Bankhaus v 
CMA, [2013] EWHC 171 (Comm), where the  ‘Settlement Contract’ between a Germany Lehman 
affiliate and French company was governed by English law and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the English 
courts, but following an application by CMA, the judge stayed English proceedings pending the final 
outcome of proceedings in France.  
51 E.g., Lehman Brothers Special Financing v Carlton Communications [2011] EWHC 718 (Ch), which involved a 
dispute between Delaware based LBSF and a UK company over the 1992 MA, and Anthracite , n 15 
above, between LBF and purchasers of structured products.  
52 Back to Back Transactions, n 16 above.  
53 Extended Liens, n 16 above. At [98], the judge rejects problems raised with ‘purpose’ part of test of a 
security interest qualifying under FCARs, on the basis that setting such precedent would impose formality 
and increase risk across the markets, having exactly the opposite of the intended effect of the FCARs.  
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Summary 
The table below shows four levels on which the English courts’ Lehman-related 
decisions have a precedential effect. Two levels are highlighted to draw attention 
to the particularly broad effects of cases generated by this insolvency.  
 
Table 1: Lehmans case law, and levels of precedential effect: 
 
 
Impact of Lehmans 
decision: 
 
 
Parties affected by 
precedent: 
 
Example: 
 
Specific Lehman Brothers 
arrangement 
 
 
Litigants 
 
Lehman Brothers Bankhaus v CMA 
[2013] EWHC 171: jurisdiction 
dispute, Articles 27 and 28 of EC 
Regulation 44/2001 discussed. See 
discussion in text accompanying n 
50.  
 
Similar Lehman arrangements 
within the administration 
 
 
Creditors, 
beneficiaries of 
LBIE, including 
Lehman affiliates 
 
 
Re Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch): 
the 'Extended Liens' application, 
brought by administrators of LBIE 
seeking guidance on this and similar 
LBIE contracts. See discussion in 
text accompanying n 43.  
 
Standardised financial 
documents 
 
 
Users of standard 
form documents, 
trade association as 
'keepers' of 
standardised 
documents. 
 
 
Re Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) v Lehman Brothers Finance SA 
[2013] EWCA Civ 188: ruling on 
interpretation of Close-out Amount 
under 2002 ISDA MA/ side letter. 
First case to look at these provisions 
of 2002 MA. See discussion in text 
accompanying n 39 and n 96.  
 
English common law 
  
 
All parties subject to 
relevant provisions 
of English law. 
 
 
Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v 
BNY Corporate Trustee Services [2011] 
UKSC 38: considered and applied 
the anti-deprivation principle. See 
discussion in text accompanying n 
100.  
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LAW AFTER LEHMANS 
 
Having observed that the English courts’ decisions on Lehmans-related cases 
enjoy unusually high precedent-setting potential, the next stage is to consider what 
their effects have been. On 10 October 2013, the LSE Department of Law and the 
LSE Law and Financial Markets Project organised a workshop, ‘Law after 
Lehmans’, to mark the fifth anniversary of the collapse of the Lehman Brothers 
group. The objective was to use this vantage-point to start to review the case law 
and consider its effects. Attendees and speakers were drawn from academia, the 
Bar, law firms, the accountancy profession, and the judiciary. In addition to 
opening and closing addresses from speakers involved in the administration and 
its aftermath, panels were organised to discuss property rights, contractual 
interpretation and insolvency law. The workshop took place subject to the 
Chatham House Rule.54 In keeping with the terms of engagement, the discussion 
below identifies some of the general themes that emerged from the workshop, but 
it does not identify speakers or participants at the event.55  
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AFTER LEHMANS 
 
The Lehman Brothers group’s collapse triggered a global scramble to establish 
property rights, so that counterparties could avoid the fate of unsecured creditors. 
This competitive exercise forms the backdrop for a significant number of the 
Lehman Brothers decisions handed down by the English courts (see Appendix 2 
to the paper, sections 4 and 5). It also accounts for some of the most factually 
complex and legally challenging cases, for instance, where contracts proved to be 
inadequate in light of subsequent events. Two main themes emerged from the 
discussion about the application of proprietary principles in these cases.  
The first concerned the manner in which proprietary principles were 
deployed by judges tackling the complex, grave and time-sensitive56 problems on 
which the Lehmans administrators sought guidance. At stake in MCF, for 
example, was a ‘substantial cash mountain’ held by LBIE and by sub-custodians, 
of which LBIE alone held $1.8 billion.57 In this case, the prime brokerage client’s 
fate ‘graphically illustrated’ the difference between having property rights and a 
                                                     
54 Whereby ‘participants are free to use the information received but neither the identity nor the affiliation 
of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed’. Available at    
http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule (last accessed 5 February 2014). 
55 This is solely the author’s account. It does not purport to summarise the speakers’ presentations, nor 
has it been approved by them. The objective is to report and contextualise general themes emerging from 
the discussion, which were debated by participants on the day, rather than to record the content of any 
individual presentations.  
56 E.g., see LBIE, n 18 above, which was an application by four private funds seeking information about 
their assets from the LBIE administrators. The funds were allowed to remain anonymous for the purpose 
of the application, as their evidence claimed their viability was at stake if they could not recover their 
assets promptly [14].  
57 MCF, n 28 above, [16].  
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mere personal claim.58 90% of MCF’s assets were represented by two US T-Bills, 
held by LBI as sub-custodian for LBIE. The first matured on 18 September 2008 
and the second on 11 December 2008. If the IPBA were held to apply to this cash, 
MCF would have gone ‘from being the beneficial owner of a securities portfolio 
worth $50 million to being the holder of an unsecured debt for the same nominal 
amount against the (probably) deeply insolvent LBIE […]’.59 
Trusts law was deployed flexibly in response to the problems presented by 
various Lehmans cases. In MCF, counsel for the unsecured creditors argued that 
there was ‘no trust known to English law’60 over the clients’ securities held by the 
prime broker, because the securities were held in fungible accounts, mixed with 
those of other customers, and LBIE (the prime broker) was subject only to an 
obligation to redeliver equivalent securities, and could even refuse to implement 
the client’s instructions. Further, the securities were subject to a Right of Use, 
whereby LBIE could do anything it liked with them, without notice and for its 
own profit. However, the judge considered the nature of the asset-holding 
arrangements in detail, and found nothing inconsistent with the existence of a 
trust. On the question of omnibus fungible accounts, for instance, he held that if 
client securities were held in such accounts, mixed with the equivalent securities of 
other counterparties, this did not destroy the clients’ proprietary rights. Rather, 
clients may have instead ‘a rateable share in the fungible account rather than in 
particular securities in that account’.61 The Right of Use granted to LBIE by the 
clients was more difficult to square with the trust relationship. On the face of it, 
the trustee’s power to treat the assets as its own was, as the judge conceded ‘a 
powerful contra-indication of a trustee/ beneficiary relationship’.62 Nonetheless, 
based on an approach variously described as ‘purposive and commercial 
analysis’,63 and viewing 'the Agreement as a whole' and ‘broadly’,64 the judge 
concluded that the Right of Use could be seen as the trustee’s right to swap trust 
property ‘for equivalent property of its own’.65 In short, the Right of Use failed to 
defeat what the judge saw as ‘otherwise clear indications of an intention to create 
the relationship of trustee and beneficiary between Prime Broker and 
Counterparty […]’.66 As the decision notes, this makes for ‘a most unusual type of 
trust’.67  
Property rights were equally stretched in the course of other Lehmans cases. 
Indeed, it was suggested at the workshop that the determining factor in identifying 
                                                     
58 ibid, [19].  
59 ibid, [20].  
60 ibid, [52].  
61 ibid, [56].  
62 ibid, [63]. 
63 ibid, [62]. 
64 ibid, [64]. 
65 ibid, [61]. 
66 ibid, [64]. 
67 ibid, [52]. 
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property rights may now simply be the parties’ belief that they have them. In 
Rascals, an application was made by the administrators in relation to LBIE’s global 
settlement business, whereby it stood as the hub company for all securities bought 
and sold by the group in Europe. This practice meant that LBIE traded securities 
in Europe on its own behalf and on behalf of Lehmans affiliates, based anywhere 
in the world.68 The matter before Court of Appeal related to the beneficial 
ownership of securities bought by LBIE on behalf of its affiliate, LBF, where the 
purchased securities were subject of a regulatory capital-driven, intra-group repo 
scheme called Rascals. Under this scheme, LBIE acquired securities for its 
affiliates, which it held on trust for them.69 The Rascals process then implemented 
a series of daily repos between LBIE and LBF, which took effect until the 
securities were re-sold back to the street. This meant that once LBIE bought 
securities for its affiliate, the parties agreed to the immediate sale of LBF’s interest 
in the security back to LBIE. The following day, there was to be a sale back of an 
equivalent security by LBIE to the affiliate (at the same price plus interest), with 
LBIE having the right of use of the security in the meantime. Significantly, the 
various sums were not cash-settled between the parties but paid by ‘a series of 
successive offsets’.70 The question brought by the administrators to the court was 
which party enjoyed beneficial title in the securities on insolvency. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge and found that beneficial title was 
transferred by the affiliate to LBIE under the on-leg of the repo. This conclusion 
was reached not because there was payment by LBIE71 but because the affiliate 
was estopped by common convention from denying that there had been 
payment.72 In other words, the decisive factor was that the parties had treated as 
payment as being made, even though the documentation ‘would have led to a 
different result as regards securities acquired after June 2000’.73 Similarly, LBF was 
‘treated as paying the price on the off-leg of the first repo when, and not until, the 
next repo opened’. As a result ‘[b]eneficial title to the securities passed to LBIE 
under the on-leg of the first repo, and remained vested in LBIE throughout the 
Rascals process until a resale to the street’.74 On insolvency, therefore, it was LBIE 
that enjoyed the beneficial title in the assets rather than the affiliate. In discussion, 
this case was flagged up because it marked the parties’ treatment of proprietary 
rights being held up by the court as determinative. A link was drawn with the 
modern approach to contractual interpretation. It was regarded as a cause for 
concern that this case law seems to prioritise what the parties seek to achieve over 
what they have done. The concern was expressed that, in the long-term, cases like 
MCF and Rascals threaten to undermine the certain operation of property rights, 
particularly on an insolvency, which is when they matter most.  
                                                     
68 Rascals, Court of Appeal, n 15 above, [5].  
69 ibid [62]-[78]. 
70 ibid, [11], citing the first instance decision, n 26 above, [14].  
71 Rascals, Court of Appeal, n 15 above, [84]-[86]. 
72 ibid [105]-[126]. 
73 ibid [126].  
74 ibid [133]. 
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The second theme to emerge out of the discussion of property rights and the 
Lehmans cases concerned the protection of client assets. Specifically, the 
workshop addressed the Supreme Court's widely-criticised decision on client 
assets, and discussed the lessons of the Lehmans cases for the ongoing reforms of 
the UK regime.  
The factual background to the this litigation was not only the Lehman group's 
insolvency, but the prior failure of LBIE to comply with the client money rules in 
chapter 7 of the Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS7). As Mr Justice Briggs put it, at 
first instance, 
 
[t]he combination of a massive failure to identify and segregate client money, 
coupled with the credit loss shortfall attributable to the [affiliate where LBIE 
had deposited $1 billion of segregated client money] has thrown up a series of 
fundamental problems in the interpretation and application of the rules in 
CASS7 to LBIE's business and insolvency.75  
 
One of the principal questions for the court was whether, for the purpose of 
CASS 7.9.6R, clients’ money should include only that which had been segregated 
or whether it included both segregated and unsegregated money. Further, the 
court was asked to decide whether a client’s entitlement to share in this pool was 
on a contractual claims basis or on the basis of having a proprietary interest in the 
pool.  
The Supreme Court held by a majority of three to two (Walker and Hope LJJ 
dissenting) that the client money which fell to be distributed on a ‘primary pooling 
event’ included all client money, and not just that which had been segregated. 
Furthermore, the majority held that there was a ‘formidable textual argument’ that 
client money was to be shared by ‘“each client” of the firm, so that all clients with 
a “client money entitlement” are entitled to share’.76 In other words, a ‘purposive 
interpretation’77 was applied to establish that rules were intended to protect all 
clients, not just those whose money had actually been segregated. The claims basis 
was therefore upheld, over the alternative proprietary (or contributions) basis.  
This decision has been severely criticised, including on the basis that clients 
with a mere contractual entitlement have no basis to be permitted to participate in 
the pool of segregated money under either the CASS7 rules, or in general law. It 
was submitted that the decision was driven by a concern to safeguard all clients’ 
interests, but at the cost of disrupting the security of segregated assets. The knock-
on effects were swiftly seen in the 2012 Extended Liens case, where the judge 
noted that he could ‘envisage that there may be some difficult questions of detail 
arising out [for the Master Custody Agreement at issue] of the decision of the 
                                                     
75 CASS7 First Instance, n 2 above, [7].  
76 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] UKSC 6 (hereafter ‘CASS7 Supreme Court’) [155]-[157]. 
Emphasis in the original.  
77 ibid, [159]. 
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Supreme Court in the Client Money case’, though on that occasion, he decided he 
did not have to pursue these questions further.78  
In practical terms, the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the claims basis 
caused increased costs and significant delay in the return of client assets. PWC 
reports that it has taken over four years to return client assets in the LBIE 
insolvency.79 Furthermore, since the Supreme Court decision, the regime has been 
applied in the MF Global, Pritchards and WSL insolvencies and, according to the 
FCA, interim distributions in those cases have taken ‘months or years’ and ‘such 
distributions are often limited percentages of the recovered client money’.80 The 
FCA observes that the LBIE decision has increased delays principally because it 
demands that administrators have to quantify clients’ entitlements, verify claims, 
and go to court to resolve hard cases, especially in light of administrators’ personal 
liability. It was suggested at the LSE event that separate trustees should be 
appointed to separate out the interests of clients and unsecured creditors in such 
challenging circumstances. There are, therefore grave legal and practical 
implications of the Supreme Court’s decision for all sorts of participants in the 
financial markets, and, in particular, for the 1,500 parties regulated by the FCA 
which are permitted to hold client assets and/ or client money,81 including clearing 
houses, prime brokers and custodians. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court decision has had a direct 
effect on the FCA’s ongoing review of the rules on client money, custody assets 
and mandates. The FCA’s proposals are wide-ranging (some, for instance are a 
response to EMIR's rules about clearing houses) but in part they are an attempt to 
address problems highlighted by this Lehmans case, including the difficulties and 
severe delays in returning client money. Indeed, the FCA goes so far as to use the 
facts of the CASS7 case to demonstrate how its proposed new approach of having 
an initial and a residual client money pool (or a combined approach) would work 
more speedily for clients.82  
The FCA powers are limited, however, and it was suggested at the LSE event 
that it may be time for a more radical re-thinking of the rules protecting client 
assets. Tellingly, at the end of its discussion of the CASS7 case and this aspect of 
the ‘current regime’, the FCA acknowledges that ‘[m]ost of the matters we refer to 
above are beyond our remit; however, in our speed proposal we discuss what we 
can achieve given the above matters and the limits of our powers’.83 Against this 
background, the LSE event discussed whether it was time for a more fundamental 
review of the basis of the English regime, and in particular, its reliance on the 
traditional rules of trusts to distinguish between personal claims and property 
                                                     
78 Extended Liens, n 16 above, [176].  
79 FCA, Review of the client assets regime for investment business, Consultation Paper CP/13, (July 2013), [2.27], 
referencing PWC’s ninth progress report. Available at http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/consultation-papers/cp13-5 (last accessed 20 December 2013). 
80 ibid, [2.10]. 
81 ibid, [1.8]. 
82 ibid, [2.27]. 
83 ibid, [2.13]. 
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rights. One pressing problem cited with this approach, in addition to the lengthy 
delays mentioned already, was that it leaves clients with a considerable exposure to 
any shortfall in the pool. Further, it was a submitted that the rules about the 
identification of trust property and tracing are extremely difficult to apply in the 
context of financial transactions, especially given the interchangeability of assets, 
international nature of the markets, and the ubiquitous right of use. This argument 
was further developed by way of a comparison with the US regime, where clients 
are protected by way of statutory priority.  
In conclusion, the discussion at the LSE event observed how the English 
courts took a flexible approach to property rights in an attempt to safeguard 
clients' interests in this challenging context. The discussion, however, suggested 
that this was far from ideal from the point of view either of the long-term 
certainty of proprietary principles or the realities of insolvency practice. It might, 
therefore, be time to acknowledge that, even when stretched this far, proprietary 
principles are not the best way of protecting clients exposed to insolvencies in the 
modern financial markets.  
 
CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION AFTER LEHMANS 
 
Many Lehman decisions required the court to engage in contractual interpretation. 
Litigation about property rights, noted above, threw up questions of contractual 
interpretation, for example, where the court was required to determine if parties to 
a contract had intended a trust to arise. Other interpretation cases centred on the 
meaning of terms regarding payment and termination on insolvency. For instance, 
the courts were required to decide how the Non-defaulting Party’s payment 
obligations under the ISDA MA were affected by a Lehman entity’s continuing 
insolvency. In other, ongoing litigation, the court has been asked to consider the 
interplay of contractual agreements and insolvency rules in order to determine 
which has priority, out of a claim under a subordinated debt instrument and post-
administration interest.84 Stepping back, can any themes be identified from the 
contractual interpretation aspects of these diverse decisions? 
One common denominator is the subject-matter of many of these 
interpretative exercises, which may be described as standardised financial 
contracts. The paradigm standardised financial contract is the ISDA Master 
Agreement, which was considered (within this set of Lehmans cases) in the Lomas 
litigation, the Back-to-Back Transactions cases, Calyon and Anthracite Rated 
Investments (Jersey) Ltd (as set out in Appendix 2 to the paper, sections 3 and 6). 
As discussed at the LSE event, when the court is asked to interpret a term that is 
                                                     
84 The so-called LBIE ‘Waterfall Application’. Hearings took place between 12 and 20 November 2013; at 
the time of writing, judgment is still reserved. Transcripts of the daily hearings are available at  
http://www.pwc.co.uk/business-recovery/administrations/lehman/update-waterfall-application-
subordinated-debt-and-other-affiliate-relationship-issues-daily-transcripts-of-the-hearing-nov-2013.jhtml  
(last accessed 20 December 2013).  
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part of such a widely-used, and, as some academics put it, transnational,85 contract 
the court is effectively playing a regulatory, as well as a dispute resolution, role. 
Accordingly, the traditional approach to interpreting contractual terms may not 
always be appropriate. For instance, standard form contracts are not written by the 
parties but instead by trade associations or other third parties.86 The contracts in 
question in several of the Lehman cases were not even negotiated at arm’s length 
because they were entered into by affiliates. Indeed, in some of these cases, 
contracts had simply been recycled from one part of the business to another 
(unsuitable) one, such as happened in the Extended Liens application.87 For these 
reasons, the interpretation of standardised financial contracts in the Lehmans 
cases presents particular challenges. The discussion about how the courts have 
responded focused on two main observations.  
First, it was discussed how the courts placed considerable weight on the 
context of contractual terms and, in particular, on the commercial objectives of 
the overall arrangements. In some cases, this required the courts to hear very 
detailed oral and documentary evidence in order to construct the ‘legal 
arrangements’ in which the standardised financial contracts had been deployed. 
This process was especially complex where standardised contracts like the ISDA 
MA had been used as a building block within multi-party legal structures, such as 
within the Belmont structured finance transaction, or the secured euro MTN 
programme that was the subject of the Anthracite litigation.88 In Rascals, this 
reconstruction process involved a 
  
minute examination both of the contractual structures put in place […] and 
the accounting records employed by the Group for the purpose of recording 
their financial dealings, including but not limited to those constituted by the 
Rascals transactions.89  
 
In other cases, evidence supplied by third parties was used to help the courts 
establish the commercial objectives of the arrangements in question. When 
interpreting the ISDA MA, in particular, the courts refer to a broad range of 
sources, such as the ISDA’s ‘Users’ Guide’ and consultations,90 experts,91 and 
                                                     
85 A Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets (University of Chicago 
Press: 2011); H Collins, ‘Regulatory Competition in International Trade: Transnational Regulation 
through Standard Form Contracts’ in H Eidenmuller (ed), Regulatory Competition in Contract Law and 
Dispute Resolution (forthcoming). 
86 The implications of which for the contractual interpretation process are discussed S J Choi and G M 
Gulati, ‘Contract as Statute’ (2005–6) 104 Michigan Law Review 1129. 
87 Extended Liens application, n 16 above, [24]-[25]. In this case, the MCA was drafted for use between 
LBIE and its street customers. Later, the Taiwanese authorities required documentation to be put in place 
to record the previously undocumented provision of custody services by LBIE to its affiliates, including 
LBF. At this point, the ‘street-facing’ MCA was used to fill the gap.  
88 Belmont, n 6 above; Anthracite, n 15 above.  
89 Rascals, first instance, n 26 above [37].  
90 Back to Back Transactions, Court of Appeal, n 16 above [52]: 
                         11/2014 
 
 18
practitioner texts92. The commercial objective of these arrangements, or at least 
the version arrived at by the courts, then played a significant role in the outcome 
of the interpretative exercise. For example, in Rascals, as discussed above, the 
parties’ treatment of their arrangements, as evidenced by accountancy records, 
prevailed over express words in the ICFA.93 In certain cases, therefore, context, 
once painstakingly assembled, can actually override text.94  
Secondly, the Lehman decisions, and in particular the Lomas litigation, were 
discussed from the perspective of the courts’ willingness to imply terms. The 
Lehmans insolvency was unforeseen, including by contractual draftsmen, and so it 
generated near-perfect conditions in which to study the phenomenon. As Briggs J 
explains in MCF, referring here to the IPBA, 
  
the Agreement is silent as to what, if anything, should happen in the 
continued operation of clause 5.2, in the event that the Prime Broker either 
goes out of business; ceases to perform the prime brokerage service, goes into 
an insolvency process or does all three of those things simultaneously, as 
actually occurred in relation to LBIE.95  
 
Similarly, in Lomas, the ‘parties have made no express provision for what is to 
happen to suspended obligations when the transaction matures’.96 In the Back to 
Back Transactions decision, at first instance, Mr Justice Briggs found that the 
effects of the insolvency of the LBIE and the subsequent early termination of the 
Intercompany Transaction was  
  
a matter about which I have not the slightest doubt no one ever gave a 
moment’s thought. The result is that [construction of the transactions] […] 
takes place in an unusually perfect cognitive vacuum.97  
 
All of this contractual silence might have been expected to have been met by an 
outbreak of implied terms, but, in practice, this was not the case. In the entire set 
                                                                                                                                       
‘The 2002 Master Agreement must of course be interpreted in the light of the relevant background. That 
includes the 1992 Master Agreement, the prior case law on the 1992 Master Agreement (not limited to 
the jurisprudence on the “value clean” principle) and the User’s Guide.’  
[Emphasis in the original].  
91 For e.g., the ‘three distinguished expert witnesses who were called to give their opinions on questions 
of New York law and the Code’ in Calyon, n 49 above [12].  
92 Such as S Firth, Derivatives: Law and Practice (Sweet and Maxwell: Loose-leaf: Last release August 2013) 
cited in Lomas v JFB Firth Rixon [2012] EWCA Civ 419 and Carlton, n 51 above.  
93 See discussion accompanying n 71 above.  
94 For a discussion of the contextual approach to contractual interpretation, and a response, see Lord 
Steyn, ‘The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts’ and H Collins, ‘Objectivity and 
Committed Contextualism in Interpretation’ in S Worthington (ed.), Commercial Law and Commercial Practice 
(Hart: 2003).  
95 MCF, n 28 above, [88]. 
96 Lomas, Court of Appeal, n 92 above, [54]. 
97 Back to Back Transactions, first instance, n 26 above, [18].  
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of Lehmans cases, there is only one decision where a term was implied into a 
contract. That case was MCF, where, interestingly, none of the parties had asked 
for it, but had rather based their submissions on other contractual construction 
points, assignment and, even on various equitable maxims. The judge, however, 
preferred the implied term route to establishing what the parties had intended to 
happen on the prime broker insolvency. He explained, that, in keeping with the 
Privy Council judgment delivered by Lord Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v 
Belize Telecom Ltd,98 the implication of terms is one of the facets of contractual 
interpretation. On this basis, Briggs J found that the ‘reasonable addressee’, 
mindful of the purpose of the contract, would regard there to be ‘only one 
reasonable answer’ to the question of what should happen to the proceeds of 
securities if LBIE stopped performing its functions as prime broker, and that 
would be for the client to continue to enjoy a beneficial interest in the cash.99   
Conversely, on the three occasions when litigants did try to persuade the 
court to imply terms in Lehman contracts, they were unsuccessful each time. What 
is interesting about the failure of these arguments in Lomas (where the 
administrators alone suggested four implied terms), Carlton and in the Extended 
Liens cases is, first, that the courts seem especially reluctant to imply a term when 
the underlying contract is as widely used and sophisticated as, for instance, the 
ISDA MA. It was suggested to the LSE event that judicial reluctance to imply 
terms into such contracts was entirely apt. Secondly, the unsuccessful attempts to 
imply terms into standardised contracts confirm that a merely inconvenient 
outcome will not be enough to persuade the courts. This is made clear, for 
example, in Lomas, where the Court of Appeal quoted Attorney General of Belize to 
the effect that, where an agreement is silent as to what is going to happen ‘the 
most usual inference in such a case is that nothing is to happen’.100 In other words, 
loss should normally lie where it falls. In conclusion, the Lehmans cases suggest 
that it will be rare for the courts to imply terms into financial contracts, and rarer 
still when they are considering sets of very widely used standardised terms.  
 
INSOLVENCY LAW AFTER LEHMANS 
 
It might fairly be said that every Lehman decision is about insolvency law. With 
that qualification, however, the LSE event identified several discrete ways in which 
the litigation arising out of the Lehmans insolvency can be said to have had an 
impact on the UK’s insolvency regime.   
First, the Lehmans cases applied and developed a number of common law 
insolvency principles, some of which had received very little attention in recent 
years. The most prominent example is the Supreme Court's decision in Belmont, 
which addressed the meaning and effects of the anti-deprivation principle (‘ADP’). 
This decision drew on precedent going back to the 1860s, which was discussed in 
                                                     
98 [2009] 1 WLR 1988. 
99 MCF, n 28 above, [93]. 
100 Lomas, Court of Appeal, n 92 above, [56] quoting Attorney General of Belize, n 98 above.  
                         11/2014 
 
 20
particular detail in Lord Collins’s account of the development of the principle ‘and 
what its nature and limits are’.101 The judgment clarified the ADP in several 
respects. For instance, it was confirmed that the ADP, ‘[b]y contrast with the pari 
passu principle’ has no application where the deprivation happens for reasons 
other than insolvency.102 Most famously, Belmont puts great weight on 
commercial good faith in deciding whether a given arrangement is in violation of 
the ADP.103 In the words of Lord Collins, the ADP concerns 'intentional or 
inevitable evasion of the principle that the debtor’s property is part of the 
insolvent estate’ and it should be ‘applied in a commercially sensitive manner, 
taking into account the policy of party autonomy and the upholding of proper 
commercial bargains’.104 The eight paragraphs of Lord Collins’s opinion 
elaborating on this aspect of applying the ADP were cited in full by the Court of 
Appeal in Carlton, which described the extract as ‘an authoritative statement of 
the anti-deprivation principle’. In the same paragraph of the Carlton judgment, it 
was observed that the Supreme Court's decision rejected the ‘flawed asset theory’ 
version of the ADP, as set out by Patten LJ in the Court of Appeal, in favour of a 
test which considered  
 
each transaction on its merits to see whether the shift in interests complained 
of could be justified as a genuine and justifiable commercial response to the 
consequences of insolvency.105 
 
In light of all of this, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Court of Appeal in Carlton 
agreed with the first instance judge on the effects of the disputed section of the 
derivatives contract in question. Looking at the matter on this ‘case specific 
basis’,106 the Court of Appeal proceeded to check the purpose of section 2(a)(iii) 
of the ISDA MA, then, finding its effects were not ‘uncommercial’, it confirmed 
there was no breach of the ADP.107  
The LSE event also considered the limitations of the Belmont decision, as 
applied in the Carlton appeal. Specifically, it was argued that applying the ADP on 
a ‘case specific basis’ to individual transactions, as it was in Carlton, risked creating 
considerable uncertainty in practice, particularly for those asked to opine on the 
robustness of a arrangements governed by English law. Further, it was submitted 
that the discussion of pari passu in the Carlton appeal was a source of confusion. In 
                                                     
101 Belmont, n 6 above, [58]-[101].  
102 ibid, [80]-[83]. 
103 ibid, [102]-[106]: the ADP is to be applied in a ‘commercially sensitive manner’ [106]. Later, it was held 
to be significant that the arrangement in question ‘was a complex commercial transaction entered into in 
good faith’. [108].  
104 ibid, [106]. 
105 Lomas, Court of Appeal, n 92 above, [86] (discussing the second of four conjoined appeals, which was 
the appeal from Carlton, n 50 above).  
106 ibid, [91]. 
107 ibid, [92]. 
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this case, LBSF was an insolvent Lehmans entity that had defaulted but was ‘in the 
money' under its derivatives contracts. It therefore sought to establish that section 
2(a)(iii) of the ISDA MA gave its counterparty no grounds to refuse to pay. 
Counsel for LBSF, as an alternative to arguing that section 2(a)(iii) was in violation 
of the ADP, argued that the section breached the pari passu rule. LBSF was, 
however, a creditor, and the disputed section 2(a)(iii) of the contract was being used 
by the debtor counterparty as justification for not making payment in. The pari passu 
rule deals with the distribution of the insolvent’s estate, so its use in this context 
might have been expected to have been dealt with swiftly by the Court of Appeal. 
However, the Court stated that ‘[a]lthough we can see how an attempt by a debtor 
to resist payment (as in British Eagle) by relying on contractual arrangements 
which offend against the pari passu rule could be defeated by the application of that 
rule, the circumstances are likely to be unusual’.108 On these facts, there were no 
such unusual circumstances, and, like the ADP appeal, the pari passu point raised 
by LBSF was unsuccessful. This part of the judgment was, however, cited as 
having the potential to cause uncertainty about when the pari passu rule applies.   
The second interaction between Lehmans case law and the insolvency regime 
involved statutory (rather than common law) provisions. In this area, the cases 
provide useful guidance on how statutory rules may be applied, while shedding 
light on the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant provisions. One of the 
examples discussed at the LSE event was the LBIE administrators’ application 
under paragraph 63 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 for the court’s 
guidance about a proposed Scheme of Arrangement. Schemes of Arrangement are 
provided for by Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006,109 and they consist of a 
binding agreement between a company and its creditors or members (section 
895(1) of the Companies Act 2006). The Scheme in question here was proposed 
by the administrators of LBIE, and it was intended to be between LBIE and ‘the 
persons who are its creditors in relation to Trust Property’.110 It was described in 
the witness statement of one of the LBIE administrators as providing 
 
[…] a system for dealing with all property of, or held in the name of, or 
otherwise to the order of, LBIE which is subject to trust or proprietary 
claims, whether comprising monies under the FSA’s Client Money Rules 
(“Client Money”) or other monies or assets (“Trust Assets”) (together with 
“Trust Property”) in an orderly and efficient manner […] 111 
 
The main difficulty presented by this proposal was that the statutory provisions 
contain no definition of the key term ‘creditors’, i.e., of the class on whom a 
Scheme is to be binding once it has been approved by the required 75% 
                                                     
108 ibid, [99].  
109 As a technical matter, at this stage, the court was being asked to give an order that a creditors’ meeting 
be summoned to vote on the proposed Scheme.  
110 LBIE, n 19 above, [11].  
111 Witness Statement of Mr Steven Pearson, cited in ibid, [11].  
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majority.112 This was problematic because the proposed LBIE Scheme involved 
the holders of beneficial property rights releasing them, while a dissenting minority 
would be forced to do so unwillingly. The question posed by the administrators’ 
application to court was whether such a group could be described as ‘creditors’ for 
the purposes of Part 26 in the first place.  
The Court of Appeal and first instance judge both acknowledged that Scheme 
was the administrators’ attempt to tackle the considerable challenges of this 
complex administration. The Court of Appeal stated, however, that ‘we are not 
concerned on this appeal with fairness or reasonableness of the proposal’113 and, 
dismissing the administrators’ appeal, held that it had no jurisdiction to approve a 
Scheme which dealt with beneficial owners rather than those with personal claims. 
In light of the discussion about the flexible application of the law of trusts above, 
it is interesting to note that, in this context, the Court of Appeal was emphatic 
about maintaining the distinction between personal and proprietary claims. 
Indeed, Patten LJ expressly rejected arguments whereby counsel for the 
administrators sought 
 
to minimise these legal distinctions by treating agreements such as the [prime 
brokerage agreement] as an overall commercial arrangement which should be 
looked at in the round for the purposes of Part 26. The commercial nature of 
these agreements is not in doubt but the trust mechanism has long been 
regarded as an important safeguard against insolvency and has been imported 
into commercial contracts for that very reason […] I do not therefore accept 
that the trust element in these arrangements ought in some way to be merged 
into the general contractual framework and treated merely as ancillary when 
considering the limits of the Scheme jurisdiction or (which is more important) 
that Parliament ever intended to deal with it in that manner.114 
 
In upholding this distinction, the Court of Appeal held that a Scheme envisaged 
under the Act must mean ‘an arrangement between a company and its creditors 
[…] which deals with their rights inter se as debtor and creditor’. It might include 
a creditor with rights in the company’s own property held as security, but it would 
exclude a beneficiary with a proprietary claim to trust property.115 The Court of 
Appeal thereby provided a relatively narrow reading of the coverage of Schemes 
of Arrangement, and rejected the proposal put forward by the administrators of 
LBIE on this occasion. Outside of the practical ramifications for the LBIE 
administrators, this decision is significant more broadly, because of the popularity 
of this statutory process with companies seeking to reach a compromise with 
members or creditors.  
                                                     
112 s 899, Companies Act 2006. 
113 LBIE, n 19 above, [56]. 
114 ibid, [68]. 
115 ibid, [65]-[67]. 
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Thirdly, in terms of the impact of the Lehmans cases in this area, it was 
explained at the LSE event that the Lehmans insolvency has directly triggered 
reform of the UK insolvency regime. Notably, the Investment Bank Special 
Administration Regulations 2011 (‘SAR’),116 introduced pursuant to section 233 of 
the Banking Act 2009, were a direct response to problems encountered in the 
LBIE administration. It was noted that the section 233(3) of the Banking Act 2009 
set out five, ambitious and, at least partially, conflicting objectives for the SAR, 
including, for instance, protecting both proprietary rights and the unsecured estate. 
The April 2013 interim review of the SAR, published by Peter Bloxham,117 was 
discussed, though his final in-depth report had not been published at the time of 
the LSE event. The Bloxham review concluded that the SAR have made helpful 
amendments to the existing legal framework, though found that they have not 
introduced radical change. Making reference to the LBIE litigation, as well as the 
three firms which have, to date, been placed in special administration118 the review 
identified areas for improvement. These included the need for a mechanism that 
facilitates the rapid transfer of customer's positions and limitations to the liabilities 
faced by administrators. Thus, the SAR were found to have made a contribution 
to promoting the objectives in the Banking Act, though their effectiveness could 
still be improved.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There have been over 30 Lehmans decisions handed down by the English courts 
since the collapse of the group in 2008. The overall objective of this paper has 
been to highlight the impact of those decisions beyond the administration itself. It 
has argued that this task requires thinking about the impact of the case law on 
other users of standard form contracts, on the global financial markets, on English 
common law and on UK regulation.  
Many of those involved in the Lehmans litigation have acknowledged the 
third party effects of the cases as they have gone along. To take one example, the 
Court of Appeal in the Scheme of Arrangement application heard from the 
London Investment Banking Association (LIBA). This organisation put its case 
particularly bluntly, warning that allowing the administrators’ proposed Scheme of 
Arrangement would have ‘unfortunate implications for London as a world 
financial centre’.119 As discussed above, the judiciary has, in turn, expressly 
acknowledged the market-wide impact of the Lehmans decisions, most notably, 
                                                     
116 SI 2011/245. 
117 P Bloxham, Review of the Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 2011 (HM Treasury: 2013) 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/190983/peter_bloxha
m_review_of_investment_bank_sar2011_.pdf (last accessed 5 February 2014). 
118 MF Global UK Ltd, Worldspreads Ltd and Pritchard Stockbrokers Ltd.  
119 LBIE, n 19 above, [76].  
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perhaps, in those judgments interpreting the ISDA MA. Famously, this contract 
was described by Mr Justice Briggs, before interpreting key sections of it in Lomas, 
as ‘[…] probably the most important standard market agreement used in the 
financial world’.120  
Submissions by LIBA, ISDA and other interested parties, and the recognition 
of the broader impact of the cases within judgments, are all highly significant, but 
there remains a difference between acknowledging third party effects over the 
course of a particular piece of litigation, and assessing the precedential effects of a 
set of cases in a systematic way. Scholars of regulation have long seen the benefit 
of this sort of ‘big picture’ analysis in helping to understand the long-term effects 
of financial crises. For example, there is a well-established literature debating the 
shared characteristics of the waves of regulatory reforms that inevitably follow on 
from financial crashes.121 Though spikes of litigation seem an equally inevitable 
aspect of the aftermath of crises, scholars of the common law have tended not to 
undertake this sort of inquiry. As a result, there remains a gap in our 
understanding of the long-term effects of calamities like the collapse of Lehmans. 
The LSE workshop was designed to acknowledge the importance of the case law 
in telling this story. It is hoped that the brief report of this event offered here, 
focusing on contractual interpretation, the law of trusts and insolvency law, will 
help to raise awareness of the wholesale effects of the Lehmans case law, and 
thereby spark a broader debate about the impact of crises by way of the courts.  
  
                                                     
120 Lomas, n 20 above, [53]. 
121 See, e.g., J Coffee ‘The political economy of Dodd-Frank: Why financial reform tends to be frustrated 
and systemic risk perpetuated’ in E Ferran et al (eds) The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
(CUP: 2012), which considers, inter alia, ‘[w]hy is it that securities and financial reform legislation seems 
only to be passed after a crash or similar crisis?’ 302.  
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APPENDIX 1:  
 
Lehman Brothers insolvency: English judicial decisions, by court and by 
date, as at 15 November 2013. 
 
 High Court 
(Chancery) 
High Court  
(QBD/ 
Commercial)  
Other Court of 
Appeal 
House of 
Lords/ 
Supreme 
Court122  
Total 
2008 2 
 
    2 
2009 6 
 
  2  8 
2010 4 
 
 1 (note 2) 1  6 
2011 3 
 
1  2 1 7 
2012 2 
 
 1 (note 3) 1 1 5 
2013 1 
 
1  2 1 5 
 18 (note 1) 
 
2 2 8 (note 4) 3 (note 5) 33 
 
Notes:  
1.  Of these 18 decisions, 12 were handed down by Mr Justice Briggs (as he 
then was). 
2.  Determinations Panel of the Pensions Regulator. 
3.  Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber. 
4.  Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2009] EWCA Civ 1161; Belmont 
Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWCA 
Civ 1160; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2010] EWCA Civ 917; 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2011] EWCA Civ 1544; Bloom v 
Pensions Regulator [2011] EWCA Civ 1124; Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc 
[2012] EWCA Civ 419; Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v Lehman 
Brothers Finance SA [2013] EWCA Civ 188; Trustees of Lehman Brothers 
Pension Scheme v Pensions Regulator [2013] EWCA Civ 751. 
5.  Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2011] 
UKSC 38; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] UKSC 6; Bloom v 
Pensions Regulator [2013] UKSC 52.   
                                                     
122 The Supreme Court replaced the House of Lords in October 2009. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
 
Lehman Brothers insolvency: Selected decisions by the English courts, as 
at 15 November 2013, by subject matter.  
 
 
1. Client assets: Urgent applications 
 
1.1 Application for return of client assets, one week after administration: RAB 
Capital Plc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2008] EWHC 2335(Ch). 
 
1.2 Application by four anonymous clients, seeking information about assets: Re 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2008] EWHC 2869 (Ch). 
 
2. Administrators’ Scheme of Arrangement 
 
2.1 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2009] EWCA Civ 1161; appeal from 
[2009] EWHC 2141 (Ch). 
 
3. Derivatives 
 
3.1 Effect of section 2(a)(iii) ISDA MA: Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc [2012] EWCA 
Civ 419, appeal from Lomas [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch) and Lehman Brothers Special 
Financing Inc v Carlton Communications Ltd [2011] EWHC 718 (Ch), plus two forward 
freight agreement cases. 
 
3.2 Effect of side letter on close-out netting under section 6 ISDA MA 2002: 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2012] EWHC 
1072 (Ch), successfully appealed in [2013] EWCA Civ 188 (the ‘Back to Back 
Transactions’ litigation). 
 
3.3 Allowing set-off between letter of credit and early termination amounts due 
under ISDA MA: Lehman Brothers Commodity Services Inc v Credit Agricole Corporate and 
Investment Bank (formerly Calyon) [2011] EWHC 1390 (Comm). 
 
4. Client money: CASS rules 
 
4.1 How client money rules (CASS7) applied in practice, when a statutory trust 
arises and how to share pooled assets: Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) 
[2012] UKSC 6, appeal from [2010] EWCA Civ 917 and [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch). 
(NB, [2010] EWHC 47 was handed down a few weeks after [2009] EWHC 3228, 
and is a short, supplementary judgment). 
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5. Client assets: Rights on insolvency 
 
5.1 Prime brokerage client securities ‘leaking’ into cash as group went into 
administration: Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch). 
(the ‘MCF’ litigation) 
 
5.2 Beneficial ownership of securities subject to intra-group Rascals process: Re 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2011] EWCA Civ 1544, appeal from [2010] 
EWHC 2914. (the ‘Rascals’ litigation). 
 
5.3 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch). Application 
by administrators for directions in relation to security documents. Questions of 
interpretation about what sort of security was created, and, once characterised, 
whether it fell within FCAR 2003. (the ‘Extended Liens’ application). Related 
disclosure application: Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2011] EWHC 2022 
(Ch).  
 
6. Structured finance 
 
6.1 Validity of ‘flip’ provision, in light of the anti-deprivation rule: Belmont Park 
Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2011] UKSC 38, appeal from 
Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWCA 
Civ 1160 and from Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd 
[2009] EWHC 1912 (Ch). 
 
6.2 Related hearing on jurisdiction, considering parallel SDNY proceedings: 
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 2953 
(Ch). 
 
6.3 Meaning and effect of close-out provisions in put options used in two 
structured finance deals, both governed by 1992 ISDA MA: Anthracite Rated 
Investments (Jersey) Ltd v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2011] EWHC 1822 (Ch). 
 
7. Other 
 
7.1 Pensions: Re Lehman Brothers Pension Scheme [2010] Pens. L.R. 445; Bloom v 
Pensions Regulator [2010] EWHC 3010 (Ch); appealed in [2011] EWCA Civ 1124 
and [2013] UKSC 52. Trustees of Lehman Brothers Pension Scheme v Pensions Regulator 
[2012] Pens LR 435, appealed in [2013] EWCA Civ 751. 
 
7.2 Jurisdiction: Lehman Brothers Bankhaus AG I. INS v CMA CGM [2013] EWHC 
171 (Comm). Articles 27 and 28 of EC Regulation 44/2001 discussed.  
 
